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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of company dividend payments is an area where corporate
taxation interacts with the personal income tax. This interaction raises some
awkward issues, such as whether shareholders who are exempt from personal
income tax should also be exempt from corporation tax, and if so, then how this
can be achieved. The solutions adopted are often complex and certainly diverse,
as witnessed by the range of different approaches used in the OECD countries,
described in OECD (1991).
Since 1973, the UK has operated a partial imputation system, under which
some tax relief on dividend income is given to all shareholders in recognition of
corporation tax paid by the firm. For taxpaying shareholders, part of the
corporation tax charge is credited against their income tax liability on dividend
income; for tax- exempt shareholders, this credit is paid to them in cash by the
Inland Revenue. Tax- exempt shareholders include pension funds and the
pension component of insurance companies.
This approach certainly has some merits, but one problem is that this tax
relief is only available for the part of company profits that is paid out to
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shareholders in the form of dividends.
2 No similar tax relief is available for
profits that are retained by the company, and corporation tax paid on retained
profits is not reflected in tax credits paid to tax-exempt shareholders. Under the
imputation system, dividends offer a tax advantage for this important class of
shareholders, which may result in a higher level of dividend payments by firms
than would otherwise be the case. Higher-rate taxpayers may have the opposite
tax preference, but the current system is certainly not neutral with regard to the
company’s dividend payout decision.
A further feature of the UK system is the issue of ‘surplus advance
corporation tax’, or surplus ACT. Put simply, if the firm’s UK corporation tax
liability is too low relative to its dividend payments, then it does not benefit fully
from the imputation system. This may arise when a firm’s profits are temporarily
depressed, or when a substantial proportion of profits are earned and taxed
abroad. These firms face a higher tax cost of paying dividends than firms that are
not in a surplus ACT position.
These tax distortions affecting company dividend choices have attracted
increased interest in recent years, as the level of company dividend payouts has
itself become a matter of some concern. The proportion of profits paid out in the
form of dividends has increased sharply since the mid-1980s, and is higher in the
UK than in any other G7 country.
Are there any reasons why the dividend payout ratio should attract public
policy interest? In an ideal capital market, it would be a matter of no concern,
since investment finance from borrowing or new share issues would provide a
perfect substitute for investment finance from retained profits. However, there is
now considerable evidence that these external sources of finance for investment
are more expensive than internal funds, as described in Bond and Meghir (1994).
This cost differential would not be surprising in a capital market with non-
negligible transactions costs, asymmetric information between lenders and
borrowers, or imperfect monitoring of company behaviour by shareholders or
creditors. In this case, high dividend payouts which reduce the availability of
low-cost internal finance could depress the level of investment spending, and a
tax system that encourages high payouts could have an adverse effect on
investment.
On the other hand, it is sometimes suggested that high payout ratios are a
good thing, in that they reduce management discretion to spend free cash flow,
and expose investment decisions to the greater scrutiny of external capital
markets. Whilst this may well be true, it does not follow that dividend payments
should be encouraged through the tax system. This would require a further
argument to the effect that in the absence of government intervention, firms and
shareholders would choose a suboptimal level of dividends. In the absence of
compelling evidence that this is the case, the rationale for a non-neutral
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treatment of distributed and retained profits seems unclear. The current tax bias
in favour of dividends for tax-exempt investors seems hard to justify, and may
have an undesirable impact on company investment.
It therefore becomes of interest to consider whether company dividend
payments are in fact significantly influenced by tax considerations. Existing
evidence suggests that taxes do matter, but is not entirely convincing. For the
most part, it has been based on time-series studies of the aggregate dividend
payout ratio.
3 However, the tax cost of paying dividends has trended downwards
over the last 30 years, as a result of declining marginal income tax rates and the
rise of tax-exempt institutional investors. This makes it difficult to distinguish
the effect of taxes from other trending influences on dividends.
To avoid this problem, we have looked at the impact of cross-sectional
variation in the tax cost of paying dividends for firms in the UK; in particular,
we have investigated the effect of the higher tax cost of paying dividends for
firms in a surplus ACT position. If taxes do have a significant influence on
dividend choices, then it would not be unreasonable to expect a firm moving into
a surplus ACT position to increase its dividends by less than it might otherwise
have done, and a firm moving out of surplus ACT to increase its dividends by
more than it would otherwise have done. In essence, this is the question we have
considered.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the
behaviour of the dividend payout ratio in the UK over the last three decades, and
relates this to important changes in the tax treatment of dividends. Section III
describes the current UK tax treatment in more detail, explains the impact of
surplus ACT on the tax cost of paying dividends, and briefly considers how taxes
would be expected to influence dividend choices. Section IV describes our
empirical study, first considering the incidence of surplus ACT in a sample of
1,218 quoted industrial and commercial companies over the period 1970–90, and
then summarising the main findings of an econometric analysis of the impact of
surplus ACT on these firms’ dividend payments. Section V considers some
implications of our findings.
II. COMPANY DIVIDENDS IN THE UK
The share of company profits paid out in the form of dividends has risen
dramatically since 1985. Figure 1 plots cash dividends as a proportion of gross
trading profits for the industrial and commercial company sector in the UK over
the period 1963–93. The recent increase has raised the payout ratio to levels not
seen since the late 1960s.
It is useful to recall that the introduction of a classical system of corporation
tax by the Labour government in 1965 was partly intended to reduce dividend
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FIGURE 1
Dividend Payout Ratio: UK Industrial and Commercial Companies, 1963-93
Note: The graph shows total payments of cash dividends on ordinary and preference shares by UK industrial
and commercial companies, as a percentage of total gross trading profit net of stock appreciation.
Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1994.
payouts from the high levels seen in the early 1960s. The payout ratio
subsequently did fall, and this continued in the first half of the 1970s following
the imposition of dividend controls as part of the incomes policy in December
1972. The following year saw the introduction of the present imputation system,
which had the effect of reducing or overturning the tax discrimination against
dividends under the classical system.
4 The decline in dividends as a share of
profits subsequently ended, although dividend increases remained subject to
controls until 1979.
5 The payout ratio remained low during the recession at the
start of the 1980s, but picked up in the second half of the 1980s and has risen
sharply since.
A related source of concern is that the dividend payout ratio in the UK is
exceptionally high by international standards. Table 1 compares dividend yields
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in the G7 countries in 1992 and 1993, and shows that dividend yields are
substantially higher in the UK even than in the US. Dividend yields measure
dividend payments in relation to equity values rather than current profits.
6
However, provided the total return on equity investment does not vary greatly
across countries, then this should give a good indication of the share of that
return taking the form of dividend income rather than capital gains, which will
be closely related to the payout ratio. Internationally comparable data on
dividend payout ratios are not so easily available, but some recent estimates
published in the Department of Trade and Industry’s White Paper on
competitiveness (HMSO, 1995, p. 169) confirm the same ranking, with the
payout ratio in the UK being higher than in any other major economy in 1992.
The tax treatment of dividends is certainly not the only factor that influences
this time-series or cross-country pattern of payout ratios. Nevertheless, it is
useful to consider whether taxes do have a significant effect on dividend
payments. If they do not, then concerns about the consequences of the current
UK tax treatment would be largely misplaced, and changes to this tax treatment
would be an ineffective way of reducing dividend payouts. Conversely, if taxes
do influence dividends, then the distortions caused by the current system may be
more worrying.
III. THE TAXATION OF DIVIDENDS
1. The Current UK System
Systems of company taxation are often characterised by their respective
treatment of distributed profits. Under a classical system, profits earned by a
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company are taxed once through corporate income taxes, and if those profits are
distributed in the form of a dividend, they are taxed again through personal
income taxes. As we explain below, this results in a tax bias against dividends
for taxpaying shareholders. Such a system operated in the UK before 1973.
Under an imputation system, profits earned by a company are again taxed
through corporate income taxes, but part or all of the corporation tax paid by the
firm is taken into account when calculating the personal income tax owed by
shareholders on a dividend distribution. The UK has operated a partial
imputation system since April 1973, which was adopted as a result of concern
that the tax bias against dividend payments inherent in the classical system
encouraged firms to hold on to their profits, rather than pass them on to their
shareholders.
Under the current UK system, companies are taxed at a rate of 33 per cent on
their taxable profits,
7 but the tax is payable in two instalments. The first
instalment, advance corporation tax (ACT), is paid soon after the company
distributes its dividend and is assessed on the amount of the distribution; the
second instalment, mainstream corporation tax, is payable approximately nine
months after the end of the company’s accounting period. Companies that are not
in a surplus ACT position can then deduct the ACT they have already paid from
their total corporation tax bill, and pay only the difference between total tax
owing and ACT already paid. Companies that are in a surplus ACT position are
treated less generously, as will be explained in more detail below.
Advance corporation tax is currently paid at a rate of 20 per cent on the
`gross dividend’ received by a shareholder, i.e. the actual cash dividend paid by
the company plus the amount of ACT paid. For example, a company paying each
shareholder a dividend of 80p per share will pay 20p in ACT for each share,
giving a notional ‘gross dividend’ of £1 and an ACT rate of 20 per cent.
8 The
individual shareholder actually receives 80p per share, along with a tax credit of
20p per share representing the ACT paid on their behalf. If the shareholder is a
basic-rate taxpayer, the story ends there, since the rate of ACT is set equal to the
basic rate of income tax on dividend income.
9 If the shareholder is a higher-rate
taxpayer, the tax credit will not completely satisfy their income tax liability and
more tax will have to be paid. The tax credit will be paid by the Inland Revenue
in cash if the shareholder is tax-exempt.
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Hence the essential element of the current tax treatment of dividends in the
UK is that part of the tax that has been paid by companies on distributed profits
is imputed to individual shareholders and acts to offset some or all of their
personal tax liability on dividend income. However, there is no parallel treatment
of the tax paid by companies on retained profits, and in particular there is no
relief of corporation tax paid on retained profits for tax-exempt shareholders.
Table 2 shows the relationship between the tax burden on £100 of pre-tax
profits that are either distributed immediately or retained and used to reduce new
share issues. Suppose that the firm earning these profits has 100 ordinary shares
all owned by the same individual, so that each share would receive a dividend of
£1 in the absence of all taxes. Under a classical system, the firm will pay out
£100(1–!) to the shareholder, and the shareholder will actually receive £100(1–
!)(1–m), where ! is the rate of corporation tax and m the individual’s marginal
rate of personal income tax on dividend income. The first column of the table
shows that if the shareholder were exempt from tax, he or she would pay a total
of £33 in tax on the distribution of £100 (and receive £67), at current UK tax
rates. A taxpaying shareholder would pay £46.40 if liable to tax at the basic rate
(on dividend income) of 20 per cent, and £59.80 if liable to tax at the higher rate
of 40 per cent. The last column shows the corporation tax charge of £100! or £33
which applies to all shareholders if the profits are retained and used to reduce
new share issues.
10 Under a classical system, only tax-exempt shareholders pay
the same tax regardless of the company’s decision to pay dividends or reduce
new issues; a classical system will cause taxpaying shareholders to strictly prefer
companies not to pay dividends.
TABLE 2
Corporate and Personal Income Taxes on Dividend Income
Total tax paid (£)
Distribute £100 of pre-tax profit Reduce new share
issues by £100
Classical system Current system Current system
Exempt shareholder 33 16.25 33
Basic-rate shareholder 46.40 33 33
Top-rate shareholder 59.80 49.75 33
Notes: the table shows the sum of corporation tax and personla income tax paid when £100 of pre-tax profits
are either distributed as dividends or retained and used to reduce new share issues.
The tax rates used are ! = 0.33, c =0.2, m = 0 or 0.2 or 0.4 according to tax status, and z = 0.
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Under the current UK system, shareholders receive a ‘gross dividend’ of
£100(1–!)/(1–c) after company tax, where c is the rate of imputation (currently
20 per cent in the UK).
11 This grossed-up dividend is then liable to personal
income tax, so that the shareholder actually receives £100(1–!)(1–m)/(1–c), and
results in the tax charges shown in the second column of the table. Under the UK
imputation system, only basic-rate shareholders pay the same tax regardless of
the company’s decision to pay dividends or not, because the rate of imputation
(c) is set equal to the basic rate of tax on dividend income (m).
Under this system, different types of shareholders have different tax
preferences for or against dividends. It is usual to measure this tax preference by
comparing the tax treatment of a unit of dividend income, given by the ratio (1–
m)/(1–c), with that of a unit of capital gains, given by 1–z, where z is the
shareholder’s marginal rate of tax on capital gains.
12 Assuming that the
shareholder’s effective rate of capital gains tax is zero, we can compare the value
of the ratio (1–m)/(1–c) with 1, in order to gauge the extent of the tax bias for or
against distributions. Where this ratio is greater than 1, this indicates a tax
incentive to receive dividends; a value of 1 indicates indifference; and values
less than 1 indicate a tax preference against dividends. At present tax rates, it is
clear that tax-exempt shareholders have a strong preference for dividend
payments, whilst higher-rate taxpayers have a preference against dividend
payments.
Table 3 shows values of this ratio for the three different types of investors at
selected points between 1970 and 1995. It is interesting to note the decline in the
incentive to receive dividends for exempt shareholders, as reductions in the basic
rate of income tax have lowered the rate of imputation and hence reduced the
value of the tax credit paid out to those who are exempt. However, although the
extent of this tax bias has declined, the importance of tax-exempt shareholders in
the stock market has increased dramatically over this period. In 1969, pension
funds and insurance companies together owned only 22 per cent of the total
equity in stock market listed companies, while by 1990 this proportion had risen
to 52 per cent. Over the same period, the proportion of total equity owned by
individuals fell from 47 per cent to 20 per cent.
13 It is also the case that large
falls in the top rate of income tax over the 1980s have brought the highest
personal tax rate closer to the rate of imputation, so that the disincentive to
receive dividends has fallen for top-rate shareholders. Basic-rate shareholders
                                                                                                                                   
11 The gross dividend’ consists of two parts: a cash dividend of £100(1–!) and a tax credit equal to the cash
dividend times c/(1–c), i.e. £100(1–!)c/(1–c).
12 This measure can be derived by considering a unit increase in both new share issues and dividend payments,
holding constant all future dividends and new issues. A unit increase in new equity, holding the value of the
company constant, will reduce the share price and the capital gains tax liability. This financial decision is tax-
efficient if (1–m)/(1–c) > (1–z), and tax-inefficient if (1–m)/(1–c) < (1–z). See Poterba and Summers (1985) for
a formal derivation.
13 See HMSO (1994). Note that only the pension business of insurance companies has tax-exempt status.Company Dividends and Taxes
9
TABLE 3
The Tax Cost of Paying Dividends to Different Investors
Exempt Basic-rate Top-rate
1970 1 0.59 0.09
1975 1.54 1 0.03
1980 1.43 1 0.57
1985 1.43 1 0.57
1990 1.33 1 0.80
1995 1.25 1 0.75
Notes: The table shows the ratio (1-m)/(1-c), where m is the marginal rate of personal income tax on dividend
income and c is the rate of imputation. For shareholders facing a zero effective capital gains tax rate, values of
this ratio above 1 indicate a tax preference for dividends, and values below 1 indicate a tax preference against
dividends.
have, of course, been indifferent over the period that the imputation system has
operated, since for these shareholders m = c.
2. Surplus ACT
Firms whose UK taxable profits are too low for them to be able to recover all
their payments of ACT in the same year are described as being in a surplus ACT
position. In particular, companies cannot offset ACT paid on gross dividends in
excess of UK taxable profits. Any ACT that cannot be deducted in the current
year is classed as surplus ACT. This can be carried back for up to six years to set
against previous tax payments, or carried forward indefinitely to set against
future tax liabilities. The present value of the ACT set-off is then reduced by
discounting.
Companies may find themselves in a surplus ACT position for several
reasons. Temporary positions of surplus ACT tend to arise when a company pays
dividends out of reserves, for example during a recession, when firms may be
reluctant to cut their dividends in line with a temporary fall in profits. More
seriously, companies earning a large proportion of their profits overseas may
experience a permanent imbalance between their UK taxable profits and the
ACT payable on their dividend distributions. Although corporate taxes paid
overseas can usually be offset against corporate tax due in the UK, these
arrangements do not usually extend to ACT. If they did, the UK government
would find itself ‘repaying’ tax credits to exempt shareholders when the tax
revenue had in fact been received by foreign governments.
14
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Surplus ACT may be carried forward to set against future corporation tax
liabilities, but since only the nominal value can be carried forward, the present
discounted value of the tax credit may be very much reduced. A firm in a surplus
ACT position effectively faces a lower rate of imputation than does a firm that
can offset its ACT immediately. In the extreme case of a firm that does not ever
expect to be able to recover its ACT payments, the tax treatment of dividends
effectively reverts to that found under a classical system. In this case, a firm with
£1 of post- corporation-tax profits to distribute would only be able to pay a cash
dividend of £(1–c), and ACT of c. The shareholder receives a gross dividend of
£1,
15 out of which personal taxes must be paid, so that the shareholder in fact
receives a dividend of £(1–m). This is exactly the same result as would be the
case for a firm paying out £1 of post-corporation-tax profits under a classical
system.
The presence of surplus ACT therefore reduces the rate of imputation that the
firm effectively faces (down to zero in the extreme case just described), and
implies that firms in a surplus ACT position face a higher tax cost of paying
dividends than firms that are not in a surplus ACT position. One way of
investigating whether taxes affect dividends is therefore to ask whether moving
into a surplus ACT position affects the level of dividends that a firm pays.
3. Are Taxes Expected to Influence Dividends?
Consideration of the impact of taxes on dividends is complicated by the lack of a
convincing theoretical explanation of why firms pay the levels of dividends that
they do. In the US context, with a classical tax treatment and a tax bias against
dividend payments, this amounts to a puzzle about why firms pay dividends at
all.
16
It is not that there are no theoretical explanations for why firms pay dividends
in this context, but rather that there are several alternative explanations with
little general agreement or evidence as to which models are more appropriate.
Leading contenders are that dividend payments play a signalling role, conveying
private information about the firm to less-well-informed investors; or that
dividends play a role in the exercise of corporate control, obliging managers to
raise funds in the external capital markets more frequently than would otherwise
be the case, thereby subjecting themselves to more rigorous outside monitoring.
Edwards (1987) provides an excellent survey of these theoretical developments.
The mainstream view of the role of taxes is that tax costs (or benefits) are just
one of a number of possible costs and benefits associated with the payment of
dividends, with the optimal level of dividends found by trading off these costs
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and benefits. Other things being equal, a higher tax cost of paying dividends
increases the marginal cost of using dividends to signal private information or to
discipline self-interested managers, and is predicted to result in a lower optimal
level of dividend payments. It then becomes an empirical question as to how
sensitive dividend payments are to variation in taxes.
It should be noted, however, that alternative theoretical predictions are
seriously suggested. One alternative is the ‘tax irrelevance’ view, proposed in the
US context by Miller and Scholes (1978). This view claims that the shareholders
who matter are tax-exempt, and so face no tax bias either for or against dividend
payments in a classical system. In the UK context, this view has much less
appeal though, since, as we noted in section 1, tax-exempt shareholders in the
UK have a strict tax preference for dividend payments.
Another alternative is the ‘tax capitalisation’ or ‘new’ view. This approach, in
contrast, focuses on taxes as the only significant influence on dividend policies.
This generates extreme predictions, that dividends should be either minimised or
maximised, which seem to be at odds with most observations (see Edwards
(1984) for a good discussion). Paradoxically, this approach can also predict that
tax  changes may have no effect on dividend payments, at least in certain
circumstances. For example, suppose that dividends are tax-inefficient for
shareholders. This view predicts that dividend payments should already be
minimised, and a further permanent increase in the tax cost of paying dividends
would have no effect.
17
Given this proliferation of theoretical possibilities, the first empirical
question is whether taxes have any effect on company dividend payments at all.
This yes/no question can be addressed straightforwardly by asking whether
company dividend payments are related to the firm’s surplus ACT position. If
the tax cost is found to be a significant influence on dividends, then it becomes
interesting to quantify the size of this effect, although, as discussed below, it is
not so straightforward to answer this quantitative question.
IV. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF SURPLUS ACT
In a recent empirical study, we have investigated whether the higher tax cost of
paying dividends associated with moving into a surplus ACT position results in
any reduction in the level of dividends paid. This study is reported in detail in
Bond, Chennells and Devereux (1995). In this section, we first describe the
incidence of surplus ACT in our sample of companies, and then summarise the
main findings of the study.
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1. Surplus ACT Estimates
We used annual company accounts information obtained from Datastream for a
sample of 1,218 quoted UK industrial and commercial companies over the
period 1970–90. Of these firms, 774 were in the manufacturing sector and the
remaining 444 in the non-manufacturing sector. All firms were observed for at
least five years, and almost one-third of the sample were observed for 18 years or
more. In most years, observations were available on around 900 companies. This
sample accounted for 40–50 per cent of the total dividends and profits of UK
industrial and commercial companies over this period.
Unfortunately, company accounts do not contain a direct measure of surplus
ACT, so we first had to estimate whether each firm was in a surplus ACT
position. Although accounts do not contain a measure of surplus ACT,
companies do write off ACT against their profits if the recovery of that ACT is
not ‘reasonably certain and foreseeable’ and the amount is considered
‘material’.
18 This is called ‘irrecoverable’ ACT, but this is something of a
misnomer since we observe firms that do recover ACT previously declared as
‘irrecoverable’, i.e. reporting negative values for `irrecoverable’ ACT. In fact, it
is usual for irrecoverable ACT to be reported if the company expects to carry
forward the unrelieved ACT beyond the next accounting year (Holmes and
Sugden, 1990). Thus companies reporting irrecoverable ACT are sure to have
some surplus ACT, but it is not necessarily the case that all firms with surplus
ACT will report irrecoverable ACT. For example, a firm with surplus ACT may
write off no irrecoverable ACT if it pays no dividend and hence no ACT in the
current period.
As a result, we supplemented these data from accounts with two estimates of
the stock of surplus ACT for each company. The first estimate was obtained
from the IFS corporation tax model, which estimates the tax liabilities of
individual companies from accounting data on profits, investment, dividends
etc., and in doing so produces an estimate of the stock of surplus ACT for each
company (see Devereux (1986)). The second estimate also uses accounts data to
estimate the stock of surplus ACT, but is based on the tax information reported
directly in company accounts (see Higson (1986), again described in Devereux
(1986)). We then constructed an indicator of whether a firm was in a surplus
ACT position using these three sources of information. We assumed that the firm
had surplus ACT if it wrote off some irrecoverable ACT during the year. In
addition, for observations with no irrecoverable ACT, we assumed that the firm
was in a surplus ACT position if both our estimates agreed that the firm had
surplus ACT in that year.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of companies with surplus ACT in each year
according to this indicator, and also the proportion that wrote off some ACT as
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‘irrecoverable’. It is clear that, upon the introduction of the imputation system,
some firms immediately entered a surplus ACT position. The proportion of
companies with surplus ACT rose from 8 per cent in 1973 to a peak of 48 per
cent in 1981 and 1982. This figure declined steadily after 1984, partly as a result
of changes to the corporation tax base introduced in 1984 (which widened the
base of the UK corporation tax), and partly as a result of the turnaround in
company profitability in the second half of the 1980s. By 1990, the figure had
fallen back to 9 per cent. The pattern for companies reporting irrecoverable ACT
was very similar: this proportion rose from 6 per cent in 1973 to 37 per cent in
1981, before declining to 8 per cent by 1990.
We estimated that 64 per cent of the sample companies experienced surplus
ACT at least once during this period, compared with 52 per cent that wrote off
some irrecoverable ACT. For a significant number of these firms, moving into a
surplus ACT position was not a transitory consideration. We estimated that
almost half the spells of surplus ACT in our sample persisted for at least three
years, and almost a third persisted for at least five years.
FIGURE 2
Percentage of Companies in a Surplus ACT Position:
Surplus ACT and Irrecoverable ACT Indicators, 1970-90
Notes: The surplus ACT indicator shows the percentage of companies that were in a surplus ACT position
according to our estimate, as described in the this section.
The irrecoverable ACT indicator shows the percentage of companies that wrote off some ‘irrecoverable’ ACT
in their accounts.



















Surplus ACT indicatorFiscal Studies
14
2. Empirical Findings
In Bond, Chennells and Devereux (1995), we report an econometric
investigation of the effect of surplus ACT on company dividend payments. The
analysis was based on a regression model of company dividends that controlled
for other measured influences on dividends, such as profits and firm size. The
analysis also controlled for some important unmeasured influences on dividend
payments: in particular, common macroeconomic influences that affected all
firms in the same year, such as the business cycle, and firm-specific influences
that persisted over time, such as the board’s attitude towards dividend payments.
These controls were important in this context. For example, Figures 1 and 2
show that the recession at the start of the 1980s caused the incidence of surplus
ACT to peak at a time when payout ratios were depressed, but it would be
dangerous to conclude that this high incidence of surplus ACT was the cause of
low payout ratios at that time. The inclusion of unobserved year-specific effects
in our model controlled for this impact of ‘the recession’.
Similarly, suppose that a particular firm consistently paid out an unusually
high share of its profits as dividends, perhaps because some signalling role of
dividends was particularly important in its case. Other things being equal, this
firm was more likely to encounter surplus ACT, precisely because it was paying
high dividends relative to profits. Thus the cross-section correlation between
dividends and surplus ACT status could easily be positive, but with the causation
running from high dividends to a high probability of having surplus ACT. It
would be misleading to infer from this cross-section correlation that firms were
responding perversely to taxes; indeed, at a given level of the signalling
incentive hypothesised above, this firm may still have responded to an increase
in the tax cost by reducing its dividend level.
To control for such firm-specific influences that remained constant over time,
we considered the effects of changes in a firm’s surplus ACT position.
Movements into surplus ACT are associated with an increase in the tax cost of
paying dividends for a given firm. We investigated whether movements into
surplus ACT resulted in lower dividend payments, and vice versa.
19 Note that
this approach was only possible because we observed sufficient companies
moving into and out of surplus ACT positions over our sample period. As shown
in Figure 2, many UK companies encountered surplus ACT when profits were
depressed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but have subsequently moved out of
this position.
Details of our econometric specification and estimation method can be found
in Bond, Chennells and Devereux (1995). That paper also describes a range of
alternative specifications which confirmed the robustness of the main findings
reported here.
                                                                                                                                   
19 More technically, we estimated regression models in first differences to eliminate unobserved permanent
effects.Company Dividends and Taxes
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Separate models were estimated for four subsamples of the data:
manufacturing firms in the 1970s, non-manufacturing firms in the 1970s,
manufacturing firms in the 1980s and non-manufacturing firms in the 1980s. For
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in the 1970s, we found that
movements into a surplus ACT position had a significantly negative impact on
company dividends, as would be expected given that this increased the tax cost
of paying out dividends.
20 The hypothesis that taxes have no significant effect on
dividends could therefore be rejected. We also found a negative impact of
surplus ACT in the 1980s, although the statistical significance of these results
was weaker for the later period, particularly for the non-manufacturing sector.
Given that taxes do affect dividends, we would like to know whether these
effects are quantitatively as well as statistically significant. It should be noted
that our analysis was primarily designed to answer the yes/no question, rather
than to quantify these effects. The impact of a long spell of surplus ACT on the
tax cost of paying dividends is greater than the impact of a short spell of surplus
ACT, but this is not accounted for by the consideration of a simple 0/1 status
indicator. To quantify the effects of surplus ACT on dividends properly would
require a tax cost measure such as (1–m)/(1–c) for each firm in each period.
However, measuring the tax cost for each firm in this way is problematic, and
preliminary experiments with a tax cost measure did not yield encouraging
results.
21
Given this qualification, we nevertheless used our models to provide some
indication of the likely order of magnitude of this surplus ACT effect. In
particular, we simulated the effect on dividends of a firm changing permanently
from having no surplus ACT to having surplus ACT (i.e. to having truly
irrecoverable ACT). For a single firm, the effect of this on the tax cost of paying
dividends is equivalent to switching from the imputation system to a classical
system, as described in Section III(2).
Before considering the results, however, two further qualifications should be
noted. First, our simulation was based on the effect of cross-section variation in
the tax cost on a single firm, which need not be the same as the effect of a tax
change common to all firms, particularly if signalling considerations are
important (see Edwards, Mayer, Pashardes and Poterba (1986)). Second,
according to the ‘new’ view outlined in subsection III(3), dividends may be
unaffected by moving into a permanent surplus ACT position, so that our
simulation can only be relevant under the traditional view.
                                                                                                                                   
20 For example, the t-statistic on our surplus ACT indicator for manufacturing firms in the 1970s was –3.2,
which is significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. For non-manufacturing firms in the 1970s, the
t-statistic was –2.0, which is significant at the 5 per cent level.
21 Among the more serious problems, the appropriate income tax rate varies according to the composition of
each firm’s shareholders; and the effective rate of imputation depends on how many years the firm expects to
remain in a surplus ACT position, which has to be forecast outside the sample period.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 4
Percentage Reduction in Dividends Implied by a Permanent Change from No
Surplus ACT to Surplus ACT
Sample Percentage reduction Standard error
Manufacturing in the 1970s 15.2 6.0
Non-manufacturing in the 1970s 12.8 6.5
Manufacturing in the 1980s 6.1 4.3
Non-manufacturing in the 1980s 60.0 43.5
Source: Bond, Chennells and Devereux, 1995.
Table 4 reports the long-run percentage reduction in dividends suggested by
these simulations, for each of the subsamples we considered. The estimate for
non- manufacturing firms in the 1980s was very imprecise and should not be
taken seriously; the remaining estimates suggested that dividends might be
reduced by 6–15 per cent, at a given level of profits and sales. The short-run
dynamics were straightforward. The models suggested that dividends take one
year to respond to the change in tax cost, and then just under half of the
adjustment to this long-run position occurs in each subsequent year.
Although these simulations were only intended to be suggestive, it is worth
noting that these effects are rather smaller than suggested by previous time-series
studies. For example, the results of Poterba and Summers (1985), using
aggregate UK data, suggested that returning to a classical treatment would
reduce company dividends by 20–40 per cent, whilst Poterba (1987) and Nadeau
(1988) found even bigger effects using US data. We do not find these differences
particularly surprising in view of the strong trends present in the aggregate data,
and the rather limited attempts to control for other influences on dividends in
some of these studies.
In contrast, an earlier study of the impact of surplus ACT on UK company
dividends by Edwards, Mayer, Pashardes and Poterba (1986) found a weaker
effect of tax on dividend payments, which was not robust to the inclusion of
year-specific effects in their model. Part of the difference may be attributable to
our use of a much larger sample, and possibly to the use of more efficient
econometric methods for this type of data, which have been developed in the last
10 years.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The main finding of our empirical study was that the higher tax cost of paying
dividends for firms with surplus advance corporation tax does put downward
pressure on the level of their dividend payments. We therefore rejected the
hypothesis that taxes have no effect on company dividends. Although ourCompany Dividends and Taxes
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estimates of the size of this effect were very tentative, they do cast some doubt
on the very large tax effects that have been suggested by some aggregate time-
series studies.
This finding has a number of implications. First, the distortions introduced by
the current UK tax system are likely to have some effect on the level of dividend
payments chosen by UK firms. To the extent that tax-exempt shareholders such
as pension funds are now the most influential investors in many UK companies,
their tax preference for dividend income is likely to result in significantly higher
dividend payout ratios than would be chosen by companies in the absence of this
tax bias. However, our results also indicate that moving to a more neutral tax
treatment of the dividend payout decision could put significant downward
pressure on dividend payout ratios.
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